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The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks marked a paradigm shift in United States 
national security policy from one based on deterrence of hegemonic rivals to one based 
on counterterrorism.  Initial counterterrorism efforts focused squarely on the main 
perpetrators of the attack, Al Qaeda, but in his war declaration address to a joint session 
of Congress on September 20, 2011, President Bush outlined the forthcoming shift- “Our 
war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there.  It will not end until every 
terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.”
1
  
Since President Bush’s declaration of a global war on terror in September 2001, 
Al Qaeda, due to concentrated efforts focused on proactive intelligence gathering and 
military interdiction, has been degraded.  Due to this fractured network, Al Qaeda has 
devolved into loosely connected sub-sects, affiliate organizations, and non-affiliate 
sympathizers.  Given this transformation, and the terrorist networks that persist, Al 
Qaeda, its affiliates, and the terrorist groups that continue to target the United States 
remain of primary national security concern.  
One of the major focuses, manifested in the passage of the Uniting and 
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (Patriot Act), is an effort to combat terrorist financing. 
Given the unconventional means of a terrorist attack, coupled with the freedom with 
which operational funds can move from country to country, terrorist financing poses a 
particularly nuanced threat.  Nearly fifteen years have passed since the 9/11 attacks and it 
is critical to United States national security to reflect on the country’s counterterrorism 
 iii 
efforts, learn from successes and failures, and make appropriate changes to ensure that 
the United States continues to adequately address the ever-changing nature of terrorist 
threats.  Is the country safer?  Have we achieved the goal of effectively combating 
terrorist financing?   
 By looking at the effect of Title III of the Patriot Act domestically, 
internationally, and on informal financial networks, we can assess the successes and 
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National Security.  When evaluating the term in its most elemental sense, many 
would identify its meaning as the concept of global powers posturing to protect 
themselves from equally powerful competitor countries.  The meaning is justifiable when 
looking through a historical scope.  However, with global powers in a relative peace, 
United States national security policy in the modern era, prompted by the September 11, 
2001 attacks, has broken from tradition to address the threats of the day.   
2,977.
2
  This number, overwhelming in its significance, has defined modern 
United States national security policy.  On September 11, 2001, 2,977 men, women, and 
children, were killed in a coordinated terrorist attack on the United States.  Since that 
time, United States national security policy has continually changed to address the 
asymmetric threat posed by terrorism.  Counterterrorism strategy has come to mean an 
absolute and all-encompassing effort from the public and private sector alike.  Since 9/11 
the United States has worked on a multi-agency and global level to defend against the 
threat posed by non-state actors who blend into an increasingly ambiguous global 
network.  Of these efforts, one of the major focuses has been tracking and defeating 
terrorist financing networks. 
As with any enterprise, the acquisition and distribution of capital is paramount to 
operational success.  In response to the 9/11 attacks, the United States government 
established tough financial restrictions in efforts to disrupt and dismantle terrorist funding 
streams.   The most significant public policy outcome of the 9/11 attacks is the Uniting 
and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to successfully 
 2 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, commonly referred to as the Patriot Act 
(Public Law 107-56).  Of the laws 10 sections, Title III of the Patriot Act focuses on the 
establishment of enhanced financial provisions.  The financial provisions in Title III 
mandate increased due diligence in tracking, maintaining, and investigating financial 
transactions.  The aim of Title III of the Patriot Act is to uncover terrorist funding streams 
and disseminate that information to the appropriate law enforcement personnel to take 
action.  In answering the question of whether or not Title III has been effective in 
combating terrorist financing, this paper will examine the law’s implementation and 
measure the law’s success through a review of terrorist financing enforcement actions 
taken as a result of the Title III provisions.   
In the fight to dismantle terrorist financing networks, it is critical to devote 
adequate resources to programs and agencies that effectively uncover these networks.  
Section I of this paper will look inward at the effect of Title III of the Patriot Act on 
domestic policies. Section I of this paper will test the Patriot Acts effectiveness through a 
review of Suspicious Activity (SAR) and Currency Transaction (CTR) Reports filed by 
financial institutions since 9/11, and the amount of terrorist related enforcement actions 
that have resulted due to the added reporting.  While the Patriot Act was a major overhaul 
affecting operations on multiple levels, Section I will focus directly on the financial 
provisions within Title III of the act that directly pertain to domestic policies. It bears 
mentioning other institutional moving parts associated with tracking terrorist financing 
from a domestic standpoint.  For the purpose of Section I, the Patriot Act will be of 
primary focus but given the paralleling objectives, sometimes different strategies and 
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policies brush up against one another in order to achieve a common goal. The Bank 
Secrecy Act of 1970 established reporting of records of primary concern through the 
Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act (CFTRA).
3
  Through the CFTRA, 
reporting of transactions with a financial institution greater than $10,000 is required, in 
addition to suspicious activity.  The Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 
Convention Implementation Act, regardless of territory, makes it a crime for United 
States citizens, or people acting within United States territories to financially support 
terrorist activity.
4
  The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 seeks 
to regulate certain transactions between financial institutions operating internationally 
through the United States Treasury Department.
5
  Under Executive Order 13224, the 
Treasury Secretary, in times of national emergencies, is tasked with using all resources 
available under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act to freeze assets 
associated with terrorism.
6
  The Treasury Department’s Terrorist Financing Tracking 
Program (TFTP) is the unit within the Treasury that enforces these actions.  
 While these enhancements add value to the anti-terrorist financing apparatus, the 
impact and scope of the Patriot Act is pronounced.  The Patriot Act is the countries 
foremost roadmap for contemporary national security strategy, and its global impact is a 
relevant metric to consider.  Section II of this paper will focus on the international impact 
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of Title III of the Patriot Act.  Specifically, Title III of the Patriot Act squarely addresses 
issues posed by international money laundering with a focus on anti-terrorist financing.    
 Al Qaeda is a multinational organization operating in an estimated 100 countries.
7
  
Al Qaeda’s influence, demonstrated through their former affiliate and current violent 
offspring, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), is proof positive in Al Qaeda’s 
continued presence on the global violent extremist stage since the 9/11 attacks.  As the 
terrorist threat to national security evolves, so should efforts to address the threat.  Al 
Qaeda’s methods for generating capital are diverse and span across the global divide with 
command and control efforts located outside of the continental United States.  The nature 
of the 9/11 attacks, financed through Pakistan, masterminded in Afghanistan with actors 
primarily from Saudi Arabia that were residing in Germany, and ultimately executed in 
the United States, had overt global roots.   
 This paper will specifically address the foreign anti-terrorist financing component 
of the Patriot Act.  By looking at the contemporary means by which terrorists generate 
income, the international safeguards implemented after 9/11 to address the threat, and the 
Patriot Act’s particular role in influencing those international safeguards, Section II will 
draw a conclusion on the Patriot Act’s international influence and subsequent impact on 
combating terrorist financing.    
While Section I addresses the domestic approach in the Patriot Act to create 
transparency within formal financial institutions to combat terrorist financing, Section III 
will discuss the steps taken to enforce informal networks.  A major concern then and a 
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major concern now with respect to countering terrorist financing is the issue of 
alternative remittance systems, otherwise known as informal value transfer systems 
(IVTS), or as referred to in the Middle East, hawala.   This method of currency 
transmission is a multi billion-dollar business and a common global practice, much of it 
legitimate, especially in countries with an underdeveloped financial infrastructure that is 
vulnerable to terrorist manipulation.  In the most basic of senses, IVTS logistics are 
accomplished in one of two ways.  IVTS is accomplished either through underground 
physical transfers of currency, otherwise known as smuggling, or through networks 
operating outside of legitimate financial institutions conducting word of mouth value 
transfers.  In this case, there is no physical transfer of currency, and these unregulated 
markets operate based on the terms agreed upon by the involved parties.  
Section III will look into the structural and cultural mechanisms that drive this 
underground network and their possible link to facilitating terrorist related activities. 
What kind of threat do these networks pose to the United States?  How frequent are these 
networks used to finance terrorism?   
After the September 11, 2001 attacks, a major focus was in the form of 
transparency.  Policy makers sought to find a way to better regulate this informal 
network.  After assessing the connection of this network to terrorist financing and 
whether it is strong or weak, the paper will address the counter terrorist financing efforts 
included in the Patriot Act, and whether the provisions have effectively addressed these 
concerns.  It bears mentioning that statistics do not paint an absolute picture due to the 
fact that much of these networks operate outside of any metric weighing system.  By 
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looking at current trends we can address the effectiveness of the regulations, determine 
best practices, and build on any missteps.   
Approximately fourteen years after 9/11, the inspirational leader of Al Qaeda, and 
the man responsible for the 9/11 attacks, Usama bin Laden, is dead.  Due to a persistent 
offensive, Al Qaeda has since fragmented and diminished in size and operational scope.  
From an inspirational standpoint, the current leader of Al’Qaeda, Ayman al-Zahwahiri, 
does not command the cult-like loyalty Bin Laden once did.
8
  But despite the significant 
strides taken to degrade the terrorist organization, the threat remains.  As a result of the 
disruption and dismantlement of Al Qaeda, the organization has become decentralized.  
The organizational structure of Al Qaeda represents more of a stovepipe network of 
loosely affiliated terrorist cells that span across the Middle East, North Africa, and Asia.  
This structure will almost certainly impact Al Qaeda’s efforts moving forward.
9
  The 
evolution of the terrorist threat exemplified by the rise of ISIS is a stark reminder that the 
threat is ever-evolving.  Not to mention the disturbing trend of homegrown terrorist 
sympathizers, who have become increasingly emboldened and inspired.  Both of these 
pose a direct threat to domestic security.  These terrorist networks rely on the chaos and 
instability of volatile countries as an operational safe haven.  The instability in the Middle 
East, most specifically in Syria, Iraq and Yemen, coupled with the trend in the 
unorganized terrorist structure signifies an evolution of the threat, and further 
demonstrates an adaptability to adapt and thrive.  As the threat continues to evolve, the 
constant that perpetually remains is funding.  As the 9/11 attacks have shown us, our 
                                                 
8
 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, “James R. Clapper Unclassified Statement for the Record on the 
Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence, January 31, 2012: 3. 
 7 
country was exposed to a non-state actor bent on overthrowing the US government.   
Paying close attention to the utility of the resources in place to counter the threat is an 
essential exercise.  
As the former deputy chief of the Counterterrorist Center within the CIA, Paul 
Pillar states that “during periods of high interest in terrorism, there is a push to do more 
of everything - more sanctions, more stringent requirements, heavier criminal penalties, 
wider application of existing rules - to satisfy a general desire to do more to fight 
terrorism, even if some of the measures adopted might not be well designed to reduce 
terrorism.”
10
  A review of the financial provisions of the Patriot Act will yield results 
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Section I: Public-Private Partnerships  
 
Nature of the Threat:  
In order to track the threat it’s important to understand the threat. Like any 
enterprise, raising capital provides material support and the means to survive and operate.  
This is no different for terrorist organizations.  In order to raise money, terrorists seek 
funding through various outlets.  Al Qaeda solicits funds through donors who relate with 
their cause, whether it is through a charity or legitimate business.  In addition, funding is 
pursued through criminal endeavors such as kidnapping for ransom; drug trafficking, 
extortion, credit card fraud, counterfeiting, and smuggling.
11
  Once requisite funding 
streams are established, the next step in the process is effectively distributing the funds to 
pay for terrorist activity.  With respect to circulating funds, terrorists have used wire 
transfers, debit cards, or cash couriers, in addition to commodities and falsifying 
documents in order to move funds discreetly.
12
  Another trend popular in the Middle East 
is an informal banking system otherwise known as “hawala”.  These word of mouth, and 
essentially paperless transactions are based on familial and tribal connections, and pose a 
particularly difficult problem, a nuanced and ambiguous form of operations part and 
parcel to terrorist activity.
13
   The flexibility, creativity, and adaptability of terrorists are 
evidenced through the different attacks and attempted attacks.  Whether it be through 
hijacking a plane, setting off bombs, or mailing bombs, it is clear that the end result of 
destruction is the guiding force, no matter what.  Such seems to be the case as evidenced 
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by the diverse fundraising efforts.  As long as there is money coming in, the means in 
which it comes in does not seem to matter.  An ever-evolving and dynamic threat, 
financing strategies can change from one day to the next.  The 9/11 attacks spurred action 
and the creation of contemporary policies to breakdown terrorist funding networks. 
 
Financing 9/11:  
As the 9/11 commission revealed, the financing of the 9/11 terrorist attacks for all 
intents and purposes went undetected.  Before 9/11 much of the government’s efforts to 
combat money laundering were focused on drug trafficking and large financial fraud 
incidents.
14
  For that reason, the 9/11 organizers were able to blend into the global 
financial system without raising any concerns.  The 9/11 attacks acted as a catalyst on 
many different levels as the country was quickly exposed to a new threat.  Al Qaeda was 
successful in funding their objectives in secrecy within the global financial network.   
The funding of the 9/11 attacks stemmed from donors and fundraisers in the 
Middle East, particularly Saudi Arabia.
15
 Al Qaeda relied on charitable organizations and 
donations (zakat), a religious requirement, in order to finance their operation.  Charities 
not only provided a funding stream but also provided cover with charitable organizations 
operating as a front under the humanitarian umbrella.
16
  All funding stemmed from 
foreign organizations; no domestic groups were tied to the attacks.   
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After the money had been raised, the operational financing was set in motion.  In 
order to finance the attack, terrorists moved money between U.S. and foreign accounts 
primarily through wire transfers, deposits of cash or traveler’s cheques, and debit and 
credit cards linked to foreign accounts.
17
  Of the $400,000-500,000 used for the attack, 
approximately $300,000 moved freely, and legally, throughout the hijacker’s established 
U.S. bank accounts.
18
  The unassuming nature in which this money was used enabled the 
9/11 attackers to blend into the global network as money was spent on cost of living 
expenses to include flight school training, travel, rent, food, and various other innocuous 
expenditures.
19
  As a result of the oversight infrastructure in place, the government 
response was reactive, and thus ill prepared to flag the activity as suspicious.  
Additionally, the small amount of money it took to commit such an attack coupled with 
the ease in which that money moved in and out of financial institutions posed an 
immediate concern and spurred quick executive action in the wake of the attacks.  
 
Government Response: 
The immediate response following the 9/11 attacks was robust.  The government 
acted quickly to freeze questionable assets and terrorist funding streams. In response to 
the attacks, President Bush issued Executive Order 13224 on September 23, 2001.  This 
move enabled the Treasury Department to use necessary measures to track down 
financiers of terrorism.  Within the Treasury, the Terrorist Financing Tracking Program 
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was established to lead the fight in tracking terrorist financing and breaking up the 
financial networks that funded such activity.  This order launched a multi-lateral 
response, pulling from both foreign and domestic resources to effectively track, 
dismantle, and name terrorists and organizations.  Under this directive $200 million 
worth of assets was seized or frozen.
20
  As predicted, the money led to names and 
organizations that directly or indirectly financed terrorist activity.  This critical paper trail 
was the starting point in creating a black list of individuals and organizations involved in 
terrorist financing.  The individuals and organizations listed faced asset forfeiture and 
blockage, a tool utilized to freeze assets in the immediate months after 9/11.  In 
responding to the global threat, the United States along with international support 
motivated quickly to track the money.  Piggybacking on the success of Executive Order 
13224 was the Patriot Act, which sought to further the reach of the government in 
tracking down and drying up terrorist financing.   
 
Patriot Act Financial Provisions:  
 The Patriot Act was passed with little opposition on October 26, 2001.   A 
legislative phenomena with respect to the immediacy in which it was passed, the Patriot 
Act was the major legislative action taken in response to the 9/11 attacks.  Title III of the 
Patriot Act, The International Money laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing 
Act of 2001, was the major financial overhaul within the act.  These measures established 
several amendments to the Bank Secrecy Act, in addition to new rules to enhance the 
Treasury Department’s capabilities to track illicit funds.  The major domestic objective of 
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Title III was to create a public-private system for reporting and investigating activity that 
could yield results in the fight against terrorist financing.  In doing so, Title III 
exemplified a significant step in oversight responsibilities by the government, in addition 
to expanded responsibilities for domestic financial institutions.  Within Title III, several 
particular sections directly affect the public-private partnership established within the 
law.   
In complying with the Patriot Act, domestic financial institutions are most 
affected by sections 312, 314, 356, and 363 under Title III of the Patriot Act.  Section 312 
mandates the establishment of a system for private banks to detect and report money- 
laundering transactions.
21
  This means that financial institutions need to create or build 
upon their existing reporting apparatus in order to meet Patriot Act requirements.   
Section 314 empowers the Secretary of the Treasury to establish policies and 
guidelines for financial institutions and law enforcement to share information about 
terrorist financing.
22
  In establishing these new procedures, this section seeks to facilitate 
greater access to information for financial institutions and law enforcement alike in order 
to track suspicious activity that could be linked to terrorist financing.  For financial 
institutions, that means greater analysis and reports from the government regarding 
terrorist financing trends.  For the government, it means greater access to private sector 
information in the name of national security.  
 Section 356 requires the Treasury to keep financial institutions up to date with 
the regulations, in addition to requirements to share information gathered with respective 
                                                 
21
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agencies within the intelligence community.
23
  With the new law it’s important for 
business to understand how they are affected year in and year out.  It is the Treasury’s 
responsibility to take the lead in providing this transparency.   
To encourage compliance, section 363 of the law increases noncompliance civil 
penalties and fines to $1,000,000, up from $10,000 and $250,000 respectively.
24
    
Section 366 requires the Treasury to report to Congress on the expansion of 
currency transaction reporting, and in doing so provide a method for minimizing the 
submission of these reports that provide little utility to law enforcement.
25
  As each 
section reflects, the Patriot Act requires great participation.  In carrying out most of the 
responsibilities by the government, the Treasury Department shoulders the burden.    
The lead government agency tasked with overseeing financial activities with 
respect to terrorist financing is the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), 
housed within the Treasury Department.   In functioning as the main anti-terrorist 
financing body, the FinCEN is the lead public agency conveying the Patriot Act message 
to the private sector.  As Table 1 shows, the dramatic increase in FinCEN’s post-9/11 
budget reflects the added responsibilities and enhanced capabilities on the Treasury 
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 Since the enactment of anti-money laundering programs to address terrorist 
financing in 2002, FinCEN’s budget has increased from $51 million in fiscal year 2003 to 
over 150 million in fiscal year 2014.  With respect to manpower, FinCEN’s staff has 
progressively expanded since 2001.  This increase in budget and workforce after 9/11 
suggests a concerted investment in tracking terrorist financing, as evidenced by President 
Bush’s declaration of financial war on terror at FinCEN.
27
  Since 9/11, breaking up 
terrorist financing has been a vital interest of FinCEN.  The pursuit to combat terrorism is 
a top priority for FinCEN, as depicted by FinCEN’s strategic report from 2008-2012.  In 
the report, two out of the three major initiatives center on anti-terrorist financing.  The 
first strategic goal of FinCEN is to fortify financial institutions against abuse by terrorists, 
and the second is to focus on deterrence and detection of terrorist financing.
28
  In efforts 
to accomplish these goals, FinCEN relies heavily on the private sector with respect to 
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information sharing.  FinCEN is tasked with communication and enforcement of Patriot 
Act regulations, while businesses report activity through anti-money laundering programs 
(AML).  In tracking terrorist financing, the Treasury Department under the Patriot Act 
has dutifully brought the private sector into the fold.   
 
Effect on Financial Institutions: 
 The main added responsibility of the private sector under the Patriot Act is in 
reporting.  Provisions in the Patriot Act set strict rules for compliance in reporting 
suspicious activity and increased information sharing with law enforcement.  Reporting 
activity comes in the form of two major reports, suspicious activity reports (SAR), and 
currency transaction reports (CTR).  In its purest form, the Patriot Act promotes 
information sharing and coordination with government agencies.  In filing both SARs and 
CTRs the government has amassed a database of information that can be used as an 
investigative tool for law enforcement when pursuing terrorist financing.    
With respect to reporting information, financial services file SARs.  The SAR, a 
tool used to provide a uniform report was created as a part of the Annunzio-Wylie Anti-
Money Laundering Act.  Under the law, financial institutions are required to flag 
suspicious activity.
29
   At its inception in 1996, the main intent of SAR reporting was to 
connect the public to the private and offer a streamlined database for federal investigators 
to review information and build cases against money launderers.  After the 9/11 attacks, 
the Patriot Act expanded the role of the SAR from providing not only money laundering 
information but also intelligence information in hopes of tracking finances linked to 
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   In addition to expanding SAR responsibilities, more financial 
institutions were included under stricter SAR filing requirements under the Patriot Act.  
SARs come in four different forms, SAR-C, SAR-MSB, SAR-DI (TD F 90-
22.47), and SAR SF.  As reflected by the FinCEN website, the SAR form most requested 
is the SAR-DI, or the Suspicious Activity Report for Depository Institutions.  This report 
is a five-page form that requests general financial institution information, general suspect 
information, suspect activity, and a detailed description section to justify the report.  In 
lieu of paper copies, financial institutions have the option to file SARs electronically.  
The SAR form, a work in progress, has changed over eight times since 2007.
31
   Table 2 
displays the number of SARs filed between 2000 and July 2014.   
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 As the chart displays, the added SAR requirements and the increase in institutions 
filing has greatly increased the number of reports filed within FinCEN.  From 1996 
through 2001 the number of total SARs filed was 729,833.
33
  As reflected by Table 2 the 
number of SARS filed during 2013 alone was 1,640,391
34
, over a seven fold increase 
since 2000.  In complying with the Patriot Act, the influx in reporting suggests in a more 
proactive approach in reporting suspicious activity by financial institutions.  The 
Treasury Department, as mandated by law, has proactively established the guidelines 
with which to work, and also has the added the leverage of increased fines for 
noncompliance from financial institutions.   
In addition to SAR filing, the Patriot Act expanded the role of CTRs.  Title 366 of 
the Patriot Act directs the Treasury to study the expansion of the current CTR system and 
report to Congress with respect to a path forward.
35
   CTRs come in two different forms: 
CTR 104 and CTR-C 103.  As reflected by the FinCEN website, the most frequently 
requested CTR is the standard form 104.  The CTR 104 is a four-page form that requests 
information regarding the person involved in the transaction, the amount and type of 
transaction, and information regarding the institution where the transaction took place.  
As depicted in Table 3, CTR reporting has experienced an increase in reporting since 
2002.  Although not as dramatic as the increase in SAR reporting, the data does reveal a 
steady trend as reporting has increased from approximately 12 million filed in 2001 to 
nearly 16 million at its peak in 2008.   
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As discussed above, the increase in reporting of both SARs and CTRs can be 
attributed to the increase in financial institutions reporting data, in addition to an increase 
in the criteria of data to report.  SAR and CTR reporting represents a serious commitment 
of time and resources in reporting, storing, and interpreting information.  The major 
effects on business are that of workforce, and cost.  With respect to workforce, financial 
institutions must hire employees to manage the operation and track suspicious activity.  A 
2008 Wake Forest Law review estimated the amount of time financial institutions 
devoted to filing SARs and CTRs by calculating FinCEN’s estimate of 25 minutes per 
report by the amount of reports filed in a year.  In 2001 the estimated staff hours devoted 
to SAR filing was 84,807 hours.
37
  In 2006, that number increased to 236,283 staff 
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  In 2001 the estimated staff hours devoted to CTR filing was 5,249,999.
39
 In 
2006, the number increased to 6,664,367.
40
  
Regarding cost, financial institutions from small to large all fall under the Patriot 
Act compliance umbrella.  Flagging suspicious activity takes a great amount of time and 
resources.  Some reports have tagged the cost of financial institutions to comply with the 
Patriot Act at $7 billion a year.
41
  The burden to cover these costs is not shouldered by 
financial institutions alone as estimates suggest that financial institutions pass some costs 
onto consumers of bank services at a cost of approximately 1 billion dollars annually.
42
    
As statistics suggest, monitoring, and reporting activity requires tremendous 
resources and manpower.  In the name of anti-terrorist financing, Title III of the Patriot 
Act increased reporting requirements by the private sector and oversight responsibility by 
the government.  As the data reveals, the Patriot Act has been successful in amassing a 
database of financial transactions and fostering greater transparency between the public 
and private sector.  In looking at its effect in uncovering terrorist financing we can 
determine whether the increase in responsibilities has lead to useful information in 
building cases.  
 
Results: 
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In looking at the number of reports pegged to terrorist financing, one must 
determine whether or not the outcome outweighs the effort.  The steady uptick in 
reporting can be directly attributed to the enhanced compliance provisions inherent 
within the Patriot Act as Section 314 requires the Treasury to reach out to financial 
institutions in pursuit of information regarding terrorist financing.
43
 As of November 10, 
2014 the 314(a) Program Office has processed 2,342 requests with respect to 
“significant” criminal investigations.  Of those requests, 455 were related to terrorist 
financing.
44
  Furthermore, the link in those 455 requests to Al Qaeda, its affiliates, and 
emerging threats like ISIS is ambiguous.   
An unintended pitfall of the Patriot Act is the trend of “defensive SAR” filing.  
Because of the strict penalties for non-compliance, financial institutions have erred on the 
side of caution.  To safeguard against noncompliance there is a trend towards defensive 
SAR filing.  These are instances in which banks file excessive reports to hedge against 
the possibility of a penalty.  This creates more paperwork for the private, public sector, 
and law enforcement alike. 
 CTRs alone average 15 million reports filed annually through FinCEN.
45
  
According to FinCEN statistics it takes approximately 25 minutes to report and file the 
average CTR.
46
 This equates to over 6 million staff hours devoted to CTR reporting by 
financial institutions.
47
  This represents a major commitment and the argument can be 
made that these obligations stretch both the government and private sector thin.  The cost 
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to report these transactions and subsequently vet them does not appear to reveal 
significant intelligence that links these reports to terrorist financing networks.  In over 
filing SAR and CTR reports both business and law enforcement experience an 
overabundance in defensive filing, only adding to the difficulty in uncovering actionable 
intelligence.  
While well intended, these laws were passed to cast a sharper eye on the financial 
system.  In tracking terrorist financing however, the results have been inconclusive.  As a 
stand alone tool to combat terrorist financing, the Patriot Act provisions have added 
misguided layers to reporting requirements, and based on the volume of additional SARs 
and CTRs measured against the intelligence gleaned regarding terrorist financing, the 
results do not reveal a robust effort by terrorist networks to exploit legitimate U.S. 
financial institutions.   
As previously discussed, the currency that moved through U.S. financial 
institutions prior to the 9/11 attack went undetected.  If the modern day system, driven by 
the Patriot Act provisions, were a catchall and successfully targeted bank accounts in 
question, the transactions would be memorialized through SARs and CTRs.  That 
information would be available to access by law enforcement, but it would not 
necessarily prompt an investigation or even a review.  In these instances access does not 
always necessitate action.  Without any other triggers directing law enforcement to the 
accounts, the SARs and CTRs could remain idle and allow for continued exploitation.  
This formula would put U.S. national security in a reactive posture, which is counter to 
the objective.   
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A March 24, 2015 release of 9/11 Review Commissions report on the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) - Protecting the Homeland in the 21
st
 Century - was a 
revealing assessment of the FBI’s strategies, and successes and failures in addressing the 
Bureau’s top priority: protect the United States from terrorist attack.
48
  In reviewing the 
Bureau’s actions taken since 9/11, the commission reviewed a sample of five cases to 
measure investigative trends.  The tools most exercised through the Patriot Act were 
under the enhancements to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and were deemed 
essential by the commission in each investigation.
 49
  Of the strides taken to enhance the 
nations intelligence capabilities, tracking terrorist financing appears to be a reactive 
measure.   
The Patriot Act is successful in creating a partnership between the public and 
private sector as exemplified by the increase in communication and coordination but the 
concern arises when the private sector is stretched thin in reporting information, 
especially when few results have yielded information with respect to terrorist financing 
sources.  The costs to comply with the law are simply too high. Statistics suggest that in 
2005 brokerage firms alone spent $700 million to comply with the Patriot Act.
50
  
  A double-edge sword, the broad interpretation of counter terrorist strategy brings 
in money and resources in order for government agencies to accomplish a goal.  While 
funding in the name of counterterrorism is robust, the strategy and results may not be 
effective in accomplishing their objectives of tracking down terrorist organizations.  As 
the numbers suggest, the strategy set forth by the Patriot Act represent a sizable increase 
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in responsibilities for both the public and private sector.  Intuition would suggest that 
more resources devoted to a mission would yield greater results, but this is not the case.  
The current financial provisions have proven unimpressive in tracking down terrorist 
financing since 9/11.  This undertaking, noble in its intentions, has not yielded many 
results in the fight against terrorist financing.  Of the $200 million terrorist assets seized, 
80 percent of the assets were frozen within the first three months of the attack.
51
   Of that 
$200 million, roughly 34 million was directly frozen in the U.S.
52
 This trend can mainly 
be attributed to Executive Order 13224 in the immediate weeks after the 9/11 attacks.  
This suggests that either terrorist financing has dried up or that alternate funding streams 
are being used as terrorists have adapted and readjusted accordingly.  The later seems 
more practical as attempted attacks post 9/11 have proven that the threat posed by 
terrorism is still very real.  A more targeted and strategic approach needs to be adopted in 
order to best utilize both public and private resources.  The results have shown that the 
response to the Patriot Act by the government and private sector alike was robust.  SAR 
and CTR reporting increased exponentially and financial institutions complied whether 
they wanted to or not.  But in the effort to track terrorist financing, much of the 
information provided has not proven helpful as other methods and financing avenues 
have been pursued.  As evidenced through the 9/11 attacks and the government response 
in tracking down financing after the attack, the majority of financing activities have 
occurred abroad.  While the Patriot Act changed a lot of rules to play by domestically, it’s 
effect ripples far across the international divide.  In determining best practices, 
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international partnerships are essential in the fight against terrorist financing and must 
play a role.  In a departure from the domestic effect, the international effect of the Patriot 



























 Immediately following the 9/11 attacks was a short-term reactive response 
focused primarily on military efforts.  Long-term needs, such as tracking where the 
money came from, were of peripheral interest.  After the proverbial dust had settled, the 
President tasked the Treasury Secretary at the time, Paul O’Neill, with putting forth a 
strategy for targeting and freezing Al Qaeda’s assets.  On September 18, 2001, members 
of the National Security Council began discussing next steps.
53
   The ensuing days and 
weeks after the 9/11 attacks revealed a large foreign terrorist nexus.   
 The funding structure of Al Qaeda is multi-faceted, Al Qaeda seeks funding 
through multiple avenues charities, front companies, smuggling, fraud, and banking 
connections in the Middle East.
54
  Under the September 23, 2001 Executive Order 13224, 
The United States froze assets of suspected terrorist financiers.  Paralleling the unilateral 
response by the United States was a multi-lateral effort by way of the European Union, 
and United Nations Resolutions.
55
  Through these international entities, individuals were 
arrested and assets were frozen in Belgium, France, Italy, Germany, Spain, and the 
United Kingdom.
56
  Through the deliberate tracing of money, central Al Qaeda financiers 
were identified and in many cases the threat was mitigated either through death, capture, 
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and attrition by enhanced scrutiny and sanctions. 
57
  These efforts resulted in stunting 
funds to Al Qaeda in the short term, but long-term objectives needed to be a priority. 
Following Executive Order 13224, the roots of a more protracted approach took hold.  On 




 In 2001, an International Monetary Fund estimate pegged illegal proceeds equal 
to approximately 5 percent of global Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
58
 This flow of ill-
gotten gains within the global system, to include terrorist financing, was of particular 
concern to lawmakers when crafting the Patriot Act.  Title III of the Patriot Act captures 
the financial actions associated with the law.  The various authorities authorized under 
Title III calls for advanced oversight capabilities, multilateral cooperation, due diligence 
requirements for banks associated with foreign clients, asset forfeiture of banks dealing 
with suspicious foreign entities, and increases in penalties for international money 
laundering violations associated with any U.S. banks.   
 In taking a proactive approach to combating suspicious activity, Section 311 
enables the Treasury Secretary to utilize “special measures” against any foreign financial 
entity that poses a particular money laundering concern.  Section 311 aims to add value to 
previous anti-money laundering measures by creating a middle ground review process to 
determine the nature of suspicious activity. 
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 Under Title III, the Secretary of the Treasury is given oversight authority over 
foreign financial institution with a domestic nexus.  Particularly, Sections 312, 313, 317, 
318, 319, and 377 seek to enhance the Treasury Department’s reach abroad.  Section 312 
requires financial institutions to enact special due diligence requirements to track 
suspicious activity that could be tied to terrorist financing.  Under the Treasury’s 
guidance with respect to best practices, financial institutions have obligations to monitor 
both domestic and international customers and accounts that involve their respective 
financial institutions.  Section 313 focuses on shell banks that did not previously have to 
comply with regulation requirements.  Under the Patriot Act, the aim is to enforce greater 
compliance and oversight by prohibiting domestic banks from conducting business with 
any foreign financial institution that does not have a physical footprint in any country.
59
  
These shell type banks are believed to be at greater risk of money laundering and terrorist 
financing.  Furthermore, “necessary steps” are required to be taken to make sure that the 
legitimate foreign institutions that domestic banks do conduct business with do not have 
any accounts associated with shell banks.
60
 
 Section 317 invokes “long arm” jurisdictional oversight on non-U.S. persons or 
entities with a U.S. bank nexus.  Through legal process, steps can be taken to forfeit 
assets or freeze accounts believed to be involved in money laundering.  To add value to 
Section 317, Section 318 expands the United States reach to include foreign financial 
institutions involved in money laundering.  Authorities include foreign and domestic 
forfeiture capabilities, greater jurisdictional reach over foreign persons linked to illegal 
financial transactions involving domestic financial institutions, increased due diligence 
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and compliance, increase in penalties for money laundering, and greater enforcement on 
smuggling currency to and from the United States.   Additionally, the Patriot Act calls for 
greater cooperation and partnerships to address antiterrorist financing with a focus on 
information sharing.   
 Section 319 expands the Treasury Secretary’s reach to foreign institutions by 
requiring domestic banks to keep certain records on foreign financial institutions with 
which they conduct business.  In the event that illicit funds are located, funds can be 
seized through legal process.  
 Section 377 applies domestic prohibitions to foreign entities engaged in financial 
violations with a connection to a domestic financial institution.   
 To enhance cooperation and partnerships abroad, there is language in Sections 
328 and 330 mandating coordination in efforts to maintain records, and disclose 
information when appropriate on suspicious wire transfers, and any investigations 
involving money laundering or terrorist financing.   
 From an enforcement perspective, Sections 363, 371, and 373 augment the 
penalties associated with currency related violations.  Section 362 increases financial 
penalties for money laundering.  The increase in penalties expanded to include violations 
of due diligence requirements by foreign financial institutions.  Section 371 enhances 
penalties associated with the bulk smuggling of $10,000 or more of currency into or out 
of the United States.  Similarly, Section 373 seeks to further define illegal money 
transmitting business, and imposes penalties for noncompliance.   
 Regarding the smuggling of currency, Sections 374 and 375 expand the definition 
of counterfeiting, and increases the penalty for counterfeit related offenses. 
 29 
 If and when the laundering of proceeds associated with terrorist financing is 
uncovered, Section 376 expands the predicate acts associated with the offense.   
 In diagnosing the utility of these various provisions, Section 311, is the most 
exercised provision inherent under Title III.  Under S. 311, The Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network of The Treasury (FinCEN) review countries and institutions and 
designate special measures accordingly.  The threshold to substantiate any action is that 
of reasonableness.  In other words, if the Treasury Secretary determines a reasonable 
threat based on an assessment of a particular region or institution of concern, then actions 
can be taken through FinCEN against an institution that poses a particular money 
laundering concern.  Inherent in Section 311 is language giving the Treasury Secretary 
Authority to designate a financial institution, or jurisdiction, an entity of particular 
concern with respect to money laundering.  With this designation, not requiring executive 
approval, sanctions can be placed on these entities.  The threshold to act under Section 
311 is low.  Neither presidential concurrence, nor a terrorist nexus is required; rather a 
finding of money laundering vulnerabilities is the requirement to be subject to Section 
311.
61
     
 The Section 311 process is fourfold, beginning with an initial finding.
62
  When a 
country or institution is of terrorist financing or money laundering concern, Treasury will 
review the entity in question.  The next step initiates the process of an official proposed 
rule making.  This stage sets in motion the administrative Section 311 process.  Upon 
review, a final rule is proposed whereby the Section 311 order is set in motion.  The 
financial institution remains in the final rule until their standards of monitoring suspicious 
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activity are commensurate enough to rescind the Section 311 action.  To date, FinCEN 
has taken action under Section 311 on 22 jurisdictions, and financial institutions 
combined since 2002.
63
   
 Of the Section 311 actions taken, there is no information to suggest direct 
affiliations with Al Qaeda.  Rather, the countries and institutions targeted have been 
determined to have identifiable vulnerabilities and are of general money laundering 
concern.  Of the countries and institutions targeted, half of the Section 311 actions have 
since been rescinded due to efforts by the targeted institutions to meet particular global 
standards.  Of the Section 311 actions taken from a terrorist financing standpoint, the 
language in the announcements suggest a general concern that a country or institution 
may be exploited by terrorist networks.  With respect to specific terrorist organizations, 
the only identified networks affiliated in the Section 311 actions taken are against 
institutions or jurisdictions with possible ties to Hamas and Hezbollah.
64
 
 Section 371, with a focus on criminalizing bulk smuggling over $10,000 have 
aided in the successful prosecutions of terrorist-related financiers attempting to transfer 
money into and out of the United States.  In the case of Alaa El Saadawi v. The United 
States, the defendant was suspected of having ties to the Global Relief Foundation, a 
front charity with alleged ties to Al Qaeda.
65
  The defendant attempted to smuggle over 
600,000 out of the country and subsequently plead guilty to making false statements to 
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   Forfeiture of the attempted smuggled proceeds under Section 371 is 
ongoing. 
 
Countries of Particular Terrorist Financing Concern: 
 As described above, Title III of Patriot Act relies heavily on language to promote 
greater partnerships and encourage greater cooperation from foreign partners of particular 
terrorist financing concern.  From a national security standpoint, the focal point for 
violent extremism resides in the Middle East.  As such, it is reasonable to infer that much 
of the focus for cooperation to combat terrorist financing relies on enhanced partnerships 
in the regions.  Since the 9/11 attacks, global financial conduct standards have been 
promoted through both domestic and international venues.  A review of contemporary 
financial checks of Middle East countries with financial ties to the 9/11 attacks can yield 
overall results with respect to their efforts to combat terrorist financing.   
 Saudi Arabia was central to the pre-911 Al Qaeda financial apparatus.  Regarding 
the means to obtain financing, evidence suggests that Al Qaeda utilized charities with 
deep Saudi ties in order to funnel financial resources to fund Al Qaeda efforts.
67
  Relying 
heavily on the religious call to donate to charity, Al Qaeda was able to secure Saudi 
financiers regardless as to whether or not they were complicit in knowing where these 
resources were going.
68
  The al Haramain Islamic Foundation, a Saudi based foundation 
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with little oversight, was considered a major facilitator for Al Qaeda financing.
69
  
Wealthy financiers from other gulf states were reported to have funded Al Qaeda efforts 
as well. 
 By nature, it is difficult to track financial activity in the Saudi banking system.  In 
addition to cash transactions taking precedence, income tax is not monitored, and 
charitable donations, a Muslim obligation, are often donated anonymously and can be 
funneled to front organizations that are discretely funding a terrorist organization.
70
  
Saudi Arabia is not only a vulnerable target for moving terrorist financing, it is also a 
country targeted for extremist activity, as evidenced by terrorist attacks in 2003 and 2004.  
After the 2003 Al Qaeda related terrorist attacks in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia effectively 
targeted and diminished Al Qaeda’s funding mechanism through charitable donations.
71
 
 Since the 9/11 attacks, Saudi Arabia has taken steps to further scrutinize financial 
activity to combat terrorist financing.  Of particular note, the Saudi government 
established several government oversight entities to ensure better banking transparency 
with a particular focus on monitoring charitable donations.   Additionally, Saudi Arabia 
imposed legal measures to criminalize terrorist financing capabilities to freeze assets in a 
timely manner.
72
   
 As Saudi Arabia allowed Al Qaeda to generate and move income through 
charitable organizations, Afghanistan’s banking system, or lack thereof, provided Al 
Qaeda with the opportunity to utilize hawala due to its weak oversight and scrutiny.   Due 
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to United Nations (UN) Resolutions focused on Al Qaeda due in part to their 1998 
participation in the East Africa embassy bombings, Al Qaeda was wary about the 
possible scrutiny associated with utilizing more formal networks.
73
  Afghanistan, similar 
to Saudi Arabia, has made commitments to address financial deficiencies through better 
tracking and of freezing assets, and criminalizing terrorist financing, consistent with 
global standards.   
 Similar to Afghanistan, there is little evidence to suggest that formal financial 
networks were utilized by Al Qaeda in Pakistan to finance the 9/11 attacks.  Primarily in 
Pakistan, currency exchanges relied heavily on established hawala networks and 
established connections in the Middle East.
 74
  Given that the organizer of the 9/11 
attacks, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, was primarily based in Pakistan, much of the 
operational funding was distributed directly from him as the attackers would frequently 
travel to Pakistan to receive expenses, at times as much as $10,000.
75
  Pakistan has also 
made efforts to further comply with foreign standards to effectively deter terrorist 
financing.     
 Regarding currency that moved through legitimate financial system, there was 
information to suggest there were several wire transfers to and from Al Qaeda operatives 
in the United Arab Emirates.
76
  After the September 11, 2001 attacks and the revelation 
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that there were financial ties to the Emirates financial network, the United Arab Emirates 
cooperated aggressively in tracking the illicit funds and terrorist with robust penalties. 
77
 
 Similarly in Qatar, there were financial ties to banks as Al Qaeda affiliated wire 
transfers revealed proceeds held in Qatari financial institutions following the tracking of 
the money associated with the 9/11 attacks.
78
  In the years following the 9/11 attacks, 
Qatar’s efforts in complying with global anti-terrorist financing standards consistent with 
UN Resolutions, FATF Recommendations, and language in the Patriot Act have been 
mixed.  Commitments have been made, and acted upon to enhance transparency and 
create great anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist financing controls, but reports of 
safe harbor provided to an associate believed to be affiliated with Al Qaeda without any 
recourse or attempts to freeze assets have been alleged.
79
  Most recently, when addressing 
the threat posed by extremist activity in Syria, information suggests fundraising efforts in 





 The 9/11 attacks exposed U.S. vulnerabilities, but also prompted foreign partners, 
some of which did not even have anti-terrorist financing legislation, to initiate anti-
terrorist financing measures to comply with external pressures from foreign influences 
such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), and the United Nations.
81
  With these 
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institutions squarely planted as players in the geo-political arena, it is important to 
address their influence in global anti-terrorist financing efforts.     
  The FATF, a non-governmental advisory organization, has developed a respect 
and niche as the standard for global norms for money laundering and terrorist financing.  
The FATF published a widely regarded set of standards for countries to comply with in 
order to effectively combat terrorist financing.  The FATF’s recommendations serve as a 
roadmap for international standards with government bodies like the UN, which cite 
FATF recommendations when dealing with anti-terrorist financing policies.
82
  Countries 
praised or condemned by the FATF carry significant weight because of their member 
body and global influence. Under guidance from FATF from a legal standpoint, Saudi 
Arabia has adhered to the many standards outlined by FATF.  Similarly, the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE), Afghanistan, Qatar, and Pakistan have all adopted, or pledged to adopt 
FATF recommendations.  The FATF’s reach also influences S. 311 designations as 
guidance is sought by the Treasury to determine the scope of S. 311 actions to take.   
 From an intelligence perspective, The Egmont Group, a global collective and 
somewhat of a sister organization to the FATF, relies on information sharing between 
member countries to enhance anti-terrorist financing initiatives.  Additionally, other 
information sharing initiatives are at play as well.  For example, strides have been made 
through the European Union to promote greater collaboration in meshing national 
policies to include enhancements in extradition, and improvements in sharing information 
between law enforcement partners.
83
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 Through the UN, several measures have been taken since 9/11 to enhance 
vigilance in breaking down global terrorist financing networks.  Preceding the Patriot 
Act, UN Resolution 1267 placed sanctions on Al Qaeda and its affiliates, allowing for 
asset freezes, travel bans, and arms embargos.
84
  UN Resolution 167 was instrumental in 
the targeting and dissolution of the Al Haramain Foundation.  UN Resolution 1373, 
which passed on September 28, 2001, calls for greater information sharing between 
countries in addition to enhanced capabilities to freeze terrorist related assets 
expeditiously, and deny refuge to those involved in terrorist acts.
85
   
 Furthermore, UN Resolution 1617 seeks to narrow the scope of 1373, with a 
particular focus on Al Qaeda and its affiliates.  Additionally, the UN Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, which experienced an uptick in support post 
9/11, is an agreement that seeks to criminalize terror related finances, focusing on 
creating greater vigilance and penalties by member states.
86
   
 Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed onto the UN Convention to Suppress the 
Financing of Terrorism, an initiative to promote greater partnerships and information 
sharing.
87
  As such, Saudi Arabia has acted to freeze terrorist assets, over 5 million since 
2003, compared to 10.7 million frozen by Pakistan.
88
   Additionally, through UN task 
forces such as the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force, middle 
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eastern countries of particular concern have taken measures, based on FATF guidance, to 
track terrorist financing by establishing a government entity to better track charitable 
giving, close illegitimate informal hawala networks, criminalize terrorist financing, and 
improved information sharing. 
 In addition to added responsibilities inherent in the Patriot Act, other mechanisms 
through the Treasury Department to combat terrorist financing, particularly through the 
Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), are additional domestic tools to combat 
terrorist financing.  The actions taken under OFAC differ from the measures taken and 
enforced under S. 311 of the Patriot Act.  Regarding S. 311, actions are taken through a 
procedural process starting with an initial finding, proposing a rule, and an ultimate 
finding as to whether or not steps are taken against an institution or an entity.
89
  Whereby 
under 311, the there is a more observational period where transactions are monitored with 




 Executive Order (EO) 13224 authorized by President Bush on September 23, 
2001 enhanced OFACS responsibilities with respect to tracking terrorist financing.  EO 
13224 allows for immediate action against a financial institution of primary terrorist 
financing concern.  Apart from Patriot Act provisions, the Treasury Department through 
OFAC and the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP) administer such action.  
 
Results: 
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 From a metrics standpoint, there is little information to suggest that the Patriot 
Act provisions have effectively targeted Al Qaeda affiliated finances.  As highlighted 
above, the most utilized provision under Title III is the special measures provisions under 
Section 311.  Since the laws inception, no Section 311 action has been taken against Al 
Qaeda affiliated assets.  Furthermore, from an enforcement standpoint, the smuggling 
provisions have provided legal authorities additional tools to charge a defendant, but 
linking currency smuggled into or out of the country to Al Qaeda affiliated networks has 
proven to be a difficult notion to prove.   
 Given the other international mechanisms at play, measuring whether or not a 
particular country took action based on Patriot Act pressure, or some other international 
mechanism is difficult to judge.  There is information to suggest that efforts, and in turn 
results, rely heavily on established global organizations that influence greater cooperation 
and transparency from foreign counterparts.   Of the countries reviewed, all have been 
responsive in some capacity to UN Resolutions 1267 and 1373.  Much of the language in 
the UN resolutions parallel language in Title III of the Patriot Act, but the information 
suggests that the catalyst to affect change is through these global institutions as opposed 
to working bilaterally with the United States anti-terrorist policies.  Furthermore, even 
though FATF recommendations have been adopted by countries that present a particular 
terrorist financing concern, the implementation and enforcement of those 
recommendations are not easily tracked.
91
  On the surface, Qatar has complied with the 
basic standards outlined by the FATF, but their government infrastructure is targeted by 
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the Treasury Department with respect to financing efforts in Syria.
92
  Furthermore, Saudi 
Arabia has not fully committed to all FATF recommendations and other global anti-
terrorist financing standards.  For example, Saudi Arabia has yet to sign onto the 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, which was 
ratified by the U.N. General Assembly in 1999.
93
 
 The threat posed by terrorism remains and has evolved over time.  Al Qaeda, 
although greatly diminished due to a robust intelligence and military campaign, is still a 
threat to the United States.  Due to concerted efforts, Al Qaeda’s leadership structure is 
fractured, operating as loosely affiliated members across the globe.  Couple that with the 
rise of ISIS, and the Khorasan network, there is legitimate reason to suggest a change in 
tactics utilized by violent extremists.  Concurrently, a breakdown in leadership networks 
suggests a breakdown in legitimate financial structures.   
 ISIS funds their criminal enterprise through extortion, theft, and the proceeds of 
illegal oil trading.
94
  Additionally, ISIS generates income through difficult to track 
donations that are difficult to track from sympathizers, a trend exercised by Al Qaeda as 
well.  This income generation occurs predominately outside of the United States, and 
outside of the formal financial network.  As such, Title III of the Patriot Act, as it 
currently stands, is not poised to effectively target these illegitimate financial networks.   
 
Conclusion: 
                                                 
92
 “ Remarks of Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen before the Center 
for a New American Security on "Confronting New Threats in Terrorist Financing",” U.S. Department of 
the Treasury, Press Center, March 4, 2014. 
93
 Prados, Alfred B., and Blanchard, Christopher M., Saudi Arabia: Terrorist Financing Issues,” 
Congressional Research Service (2005): 28. 
 
 40 
 As foreign countries operate under their own system of laws and standards, the 
capabilities of the United States Treasury Department’s enforcement arm becomes 
understandably minimized.  That, coupled with the fact that terrorist operations are ever- 
evolving, operating in destabilized regions, and reliant heavily on generating income 
outside of formal banking networks.  Given these aggravating factors, the influence and 
impact of Title III of the Patriot Act becomes particularly strained.  As such, since the 
Patriot Act’s inception, the actions taken directly against Al Qaeda and it’s affiliates 
under Title III have not revealed marked empirical evidence to substantiate the laws 
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Section III: Informal Networks 
 
What is Hawala? 
Hawala is an informal banking network that has existed for centuries, initially as a 
way for merchants to travel and conduct business without the burden of carrying large 
amounts of currency.  While hawala was a primary money laundering concern before 
9/11, after 9/11 the informal value system has been of primary terrorist financing 
concern.
95
  It is a system built on trust and tribal relationships that offer a quick, and 
affordable way to transfer money.  Also, for immigrants to the United States coming from 
regions like Afghanistan that are absent a formal banking system, hawala offers a familiar 
way of doing business.  Hawala, meaning “transfer” in Arabic, is a system that operates 
outside of traditional banking networks, offering an inexpensive alternative to formal 
transfer systems like that of a Western Union for example.  With Western Union, value 
transfer requires registration and can occur online, over the phone, or in person for 
associated fees.  The receiver and or recipient would both need to send and receive the 
money at a western union location or through a Western Union agent. Both the sender 
and recipient are required to provide government issued proof of identification to confirm 
their identity. The transaction would not be immediate.  The quickest transaction, online 
or mobile-to-mobile would require the sender to have a debit or credit card from the 
United States.
96
  The quicker the turnaround on the transaction then the higher the fees 
associated with the transaction.  There is a cap on the amount that can be sent, $3,000.  
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Transactions over $3,000 require legitimate bank accounts on both the sender and 
recipient side and additional identifiers to include government issued identification, bank 
statements, and a physical address.
97
  
The hawala system is based on trust and connections through familial, tribal, or 
regional affiliations.
98
  Countries with weak financial institutions rely on the hawala 
network as their main form of remittance.  In these impoverished or under-developed 
countries where there is no formal banking system, restrictions on taking currency out of 
the country, or countries with foreign sanctions, the hawala system fills a critical void.
99
  
Rough IMF and World Bank estimations peg underground hawala activity conservatively 
at over $10 billion dollars a year.
100
  Other estimates suggest a global hawala network in 
the hundreds of billions.
101
  In addition to providing a means of currency remittance in 
countries with deficient financial infrastructure, the hawala system can also provide an 
almost instant transaction at a competitive rate.  In many cases, users turn to informal 
value transfer systems simply because of pricing.  When a formal remitter could charge 
ten times the price and take weeks for currency to reach a destination, a hawala dealer 
through their trusted network, could provide faster services at a more competitive rate.   
 
How Does Hawala Work?  
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There are variations upon variations of hawala transactions but the most basic 
involves a person that sends money, two intermediaries (hawalaadars), and a person who 
receives money.  Take for example the following hypothetical scenario: 
Jay (sender) who is living in the United States wants to send his cousin 
Rob (recipient), who is studying in India, $11,000.00 to pay for class and 
cost of living expenses for the next semester.  Jay solicits the help of Kim 
(hawaladar), a family friend that owns a small convenience store in the 
neighborhood, to help with the transfer.  Kim was born in India and has 
been known to help friends and family transfer small amounts of money to 
and from India.  Kim offers to help Jay out for a 5 percent commission and 
an exchange rate of 37 rupees per dollar.  Upon payment Kim will 
immediately call her sister-in-law Mona who can give Rob the 17,575 
rupees instantaneously.  Jay thinks it’s a pretty good deal considering the 
bank he just came from would take a 10 percent commission, a one-week 
turnaround on delivery, and 25 rupees on the dollar.  This would leave 
Rob with Rs 11,250 as opposed to Rs 17,575.  Jay decides to work with 
Kim and notifies Rob about where he can pick up the money.  After 
receiving the $500.00, Kim contacts Mona to authorize the transfer of 
money.   Mona in turn gives Rob the Rs17, 575 as agreed upon.  Jay and 
Rob’s interaction is complete; no receipt of transaction just a word of 
mouth confirmation.  Kim and Mona still need to settle as Mona, who gave 
Rob Rs 17,575, is still out her money.  Kim, being a small business owner 
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that frequently imports and exports goods has made arrangements to send 
Mona DVDs and various electronics for her to sell in India. In order to 
create the perception of a legitimate business transaction, Kim over 
invoices Mona’s order, sending her $1,000 worth of goods but invoicing 
Mona for only $500.00.  Mona receives the goods, sells them, and sends 
back the invoice amount of $500.00 to Kim, keeping the excess $500.00 
for herself and effectively closing the loop.
102
   
As evidenced by this scenario, the use of hawala is fast, cost effective, and reliable.  Jay 
was able to send Rob money to buy books at a lower price then a formal system, and at 
an almost immediate turnaround on delivery.  The appeal of hawala is that it offers a 
cheaper alternative to formal money transfer value systems.   A hawaladar can 
manipulate exchange rates or charge fewer fees in order to appeal to customers.  In 
addition, customers can avoid institutional bureaucracies and move currency quickly at a 
competitive rate.  The above hypothetical scenario is an example of the most basic 
hawala transaction.  A sender connects with a dealer, who connects with a dealer, who 
connects with a recipient.  Because of the informal nature of the transfer system, hawala 
transactions differ from network to network.  A different scenario could easily involve 
more than two intermediaries operating out of different countries, creating yet another 
layer in the system and further hiding the needle in the proverbial hay stack.  Without a 
defined paper trail, and operating across the global divide, regulators and authorities 
struggle to pin down the elusive transactions that occur from sender to recipient.  As 
more participants come into play, the complexities reveal themselves and create an even 
                                                 
102
 Jost, Patrick M., “The Hawala Alternative Remittance System and its Role in Money Laundering,” 
United States Department of the Treasury: 5-8. 
 45 
more dynamic web of difficulties with respect to tracking where the money is and for 
what it is being used.  In addressing the complexities inherent in tracking this informal 
network, the government took greater regulatory steps after 9/11 to try and better track 
informal remitters.  From a cash smuggling perspective, a tangible target could be pinned 
down.  In dealing with hawala, since there is no currency changing hands, these 
regulations do not apply.  Patriot Act regulations were aimed at creating greater 
transparency and identifying suspicious transactions manifested in SARs which are self 
reported, or in the case of CTRs, automatically reported when dealing with transactions 
above $10,000.  In implementing these due diligence requirements, the onus rests heavily 
on legitimate institutions to identify activity and report it accordingly to FinCEN.  
 
Current Regulations: 9/11 and the Patriot Act 
As previously discussed in Section I, under the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA), the 
Secretary of the Treasury has the authority to establish certain checks on financial 
institutions in order to promote best practices, and provide adequate resources to law 
enforcement officials for the purpose of curbing illegal activity.  In the wake of 9/11, 
much of the changes made were to provide greater information sharing among public and 
private institutions with the mindset that more requirements in reporting would yield 
greater transparency with respect to tracking terrorist financing activity.  In addressing 
the informal money transmitters, the Patriot Act amended the BSA to clearly state that 
money transmitters, whether formal or informal, are all subject to the BSA.  What this 
means is that hawalas post 9/11 are required to register with FinCEN as money services 
businesses (MSBs).  Furthermore they are subject to the same rules and regulations 
 46 
consistent with formal financial networks.  That means keeping financial records, to 
include customer information, and to report suspicious activities via SARs and CTRs.
103
  
In order to try and enforce compliance, strict penalties were enacted in the form of fines 
at the cost of $5,000 a day for money service businesses that fail to register with FinCEN, 
and the possibility of five years imprisonment for operating an unregistered system. 
In the majority of cases, the use of hawala is to fulfill a legitimate need, in many 
scenarios sending remittance back to an immigrant’s home country to support family and 
loved ones.  The concern however, is when the hawala network is used to facilitate illegal 
activity, most important the financing of terror. Given the lack of paper trail, and the 
ability to operate outside of formal networks, many turn to hawala as a means to facilitate 
illegitimate or illegal activity.  Because of the popularity of the hawala system in the 
Middle East, this poses a particularly difficult national security problem for the United 
States.  In efforts to combat the illegitimate use of hawala, the Patriot Act took significant 
measures to create greater transparency in reporting currency transactions. One of the 
major measures of the Patriot Act was greater compliance among financial institutions to 
report suspicious activity.  In the most generic definition, under the law, any entity or 
person that transfers money as a business is defined as an MSB.
104
   In order to operate as 
a legitimate MSB, one would need to register with the Financial Crimes Enforcement 
Network (FinCEN), establish certain checks on potential clients, and report suspicious 
activity.
105
  In reporting information, financial institutions disclose activity to the federal 
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government in the form of Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs), and Currency 
Transaction Reports (CTRs).  Even though hawala networks operate outside of formal 
networks, there are some telling trends that can be observed through bank account 
activity.
106
  A bank account used by a hawala dealer tends to show frequent deposit 
activity in the form of cash and checks, usually from foreign countries. 
107
   A bank, 
sensing unnatural movement in an account can file these SARs and CTRs with the 
Treasury, creating a database, and providing information to authorities to respond 
accordingly.  The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), housed within the 
Treasury, is the major institution tasked with enforcing the BSA and maintaining the 
database of SAR and CTR filings.   
In addressing the enforcement of hawala networks, several challenges exist.  The 
broad international scope of the network creates difficulties.  If countries across the globe 
are accepting of this informal practice, how do we successfully partner with a country 
that doesn’t agree with what we’re trying to accomplish?  Given the informal nature of 
the system with the lack of paper trail ties the hands of law enforcement officials to 
effectively prosecute informal transmitters.  Without a defined paper trail you cannot 
effectively track the money that changes hands.  The word of mouth association is also a 
factor, if a hawala system is based on relationships, how do you infiltrate that network?  
How do you regulate the unregulated given that the nature of the system is based on 
informalities.  Forcing the system into compliance would dramatically change the 
convenience of the network.   
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The main financial oversight objectives of the Patriot Act are fourfold.  To fortify 
measures to detect, and prosecute terrorist financing abroad, to ensure checks on foreign 
financial institutions to prevent criminal activity, to require reporting of suspicious 
activity of all appropriate financial institutions, and to shore up defenses at U.S. financial 
institutions to prevent illegal transactions or activity. 
108
  Under Title III if the Patriot Act, 
there are 12 provisions that could affect financial institutions.  Of those 12 provisions, 
Section 359 pertains directly to informal banking systems.  The language in the Patriot 
Act amends the BSA to make it explicit that any and all money transmitters, formal or 
informal, are subject to the mandatory Treasury reporting requirements.
109
  This 
provision amends the BSA to further define a money transmitter to include those 
operating under informal hawala networks as financial institutions.  By expanding the 
definition, the amendment explicitly includes informal networks as financial institutions, 
and subjects the informal transmitters to the same rules and regulations under the BSA as 
legitimate financial institutions, to include filing SARs and CTRs.  An MSB must register 
through the Treasury Department within 180 days after the establishment of the business 
and renewed every two years.
110
  The form required to register, FinCEN form 107, is a 
two page document that requires the registrant to claim whether or not their MSB is 
involved in an IVTS, defined in the instructions as “any person who engages as a 
business in an informal money transfer system or any network of people who engage as a 
business in facilitating the transfer of money domestically or internationally outside of 
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the conventional financial institutions system.”
111
 Applicants are also required to peg a 
financial institution and account number to their MSB.
112
  An MSB, as defined in 
FinCEN Form 107, and thus required to register with the Treasury, includes money 
transmitters or anyone or that exchanges $1,000, cashes checks, issues checks, sells 
checks, or redeems checks more than $1,000 on any one customer on any day.
113
  In 
order to comply with regulations, informal financial institutions would need to report 
suspicious activity to FinCEN.   The threshold for reporting financial transactions is any 
transfer over $3,000.  Under this amendment to the BSA, MSBs are required to provide 
the information of the recipient of such financial transactions.
114
                                  
 
MSB REGULATION: 
The aim of requiring informal money transmitters to register as MSBs through 
FinCEN is to create greater oversight on financial transactions.  The metrics, as detailed 
in Table 1, suggest an increase in MSB registration with new registrants since the laws 
inceptions totaling 41, 681 in 2010.
115
 MSB registration since the Patriot Act has climbed 
incrementally, reaching a plateau in fiscal year 2006 and remaining at around 20,000 
registrants annually.
116
  Before that time period MSB registration was not available for 
online enrollment.  
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In attempts to better regulate informal networks, a public-private partnership is 
the lynchpin to the strategies employed in the Patriot Act.  The regulations require greater 
efforts on the public side to register with FinCEN, report activity, and establish internal 
checks to better address the threat of terrorist financing.  On the regulatory side, it is the 
Treasury’s responsibility to provide a road map to follow.  Section 361 speaks directly to 
this notion, requiring FinCEN to assist state, and local agencies with administering best 
practices. 
Under Section 371, which focuses on the smuggling component of informal value 
transfers, the Patriot Act made it bulk smuggling a serious federal offense, allowing asset 
forfeiture of the proceeds uncovered in smuggling attempts.  Under the language, 
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smuggling of over $10,000 are subject to five years imprisonment and forfeiture of 
proceeds at the time of seizure.
117
  The case versus Alaa Al Saddawi, an imam with 
terrorist ties, who attempted to smuggle over $600,000 to Egypt, is an example of Section 
371 in action. The defendan’s connection to a terrorist network, however, was tenuous. 
As reflected above, much of the activity in preventing terrorist financing comes 
from abroad, with the mindset that given the global scope of terrorist networks, 
partnerships abroad seem be paramount to success.  Much of the Hawala network has 
international implications as activity tends to center around an immigrant or expatriate 
sending money abroad to friends and family.   
 
Hawala and Terrorism: 
Because of its roots, informality, and known method of money transmitting in the 
Middle East, the hawala system is an appealing way to transfer money outside of the 
watchful eye of security authorities across the globe.  There have been hawala links to Al 
Qaeda in the precious stone business in order to launder and transfer terrorist 
financing.
118
 There is also information to suggest that Al Qaeda utilized informal 
networks to transfer money out of Afghanistan during the U.S. invasion.
119
 
 The hawala network is a global system that ranges from country to country, 
operating in regulated territories like the United States, and in unregulated territories like 
Afghanistan.  In the most common and legitimate of circumstances, foreign nationals 
                                                 
117
 United States Department of Justice, “Report From the Field: The USA Patriot Act at Work,” July, 
2004: 9. 
118
 Nissman, David. M, “Anti-Terrorism,” United States Attorney’s Bulletin, Volume 50, Number 3, May, 
2002: 21. 
119
 United States General Accounting Office, “U.S. Agencies Should Systematically Assess Terrorists’ Use 
of Alternative Financing Mechanisms,” November, 2003: 30. 
 52 
come to the United States to work, and in turn send the money they make back to their 
families in impoverished countries.
120
 
 Under FinCEN the non-traditional methodology section is the program that most 
focuses on informal banking such as hawala.  This subsection of FinCEN is essentially a 
think tank to better understand informal value transfer systems and lend support to law 
enforcement and regulators with information with respect to best practices.  There is an 
infrastructure established after 9/11 to better address the issue of hawala, and developed 
countries are better poised to affect change than weak developing countries.  In its 
essence, hawala is a difficult system to track and investigate, even more so as these 
hawala networks attempt to operate in more technologically advanced countries.  There 
are trends that have been picked up that reveal themselves when tracked through formal 
systems.  The temptation to use modern technologies such as the fax machine, email, 
wire transfers, have created hints of a paper trail making it easier to pin down illegal 
transmitters.
121
  The Al-Barakaat system is a prime example of a hawala network 
revealing itself through legitimate sources. Al Baraakat was an informal system that 
relied on formal institutions to send money from foreign nationals working in the United 
States back to their home country of Somalia.   Because of their use of formal networks, 
law enforcement was able to track activity through SARs and bring charges against the 
organization.  After 9/11, in a race to track and freeze terrorist financing assets, the Al 
Barakaat office in the United States was raided, effectively freezing $1 million in assets. 
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With respect to tracking terrorist financing however, more difficulties arose as the money 
that leaves the United States becomes more and more difficult to find.   
Of the charges brought to bear, none had to do with terrorist financing.  However, there 
was not much information to back the claim that Al Barakaat is a terrorist organization. 
 
Results: 
 Countries like India, that are hampered by the black market trade and have 
struggled with regulating hawala for years, and recognizing it’s global reach, have 
solicited help from western countries to combat informal banking.
122
   Based on the 
language in Title III, the United States solution to combating these informal networks is 
to regulate them through registering as an official money services business, and reporting 
suspicious activity through SARs and CTRs.  
As previously discussed in Section I, CTR fillings alone average 15 million 
reports filed annually through FinCEN. 
123
  The Patriot Act under Section 366 directs the 
Treasury to conduct a study of the SAR and CTR exemption process for filing, in 
addition to the related cost of filing.  As the 2002 report revealed, of the roughly twelve 
million CTRs filed, over 30 percent were filed on recurring customer transactions that 
were exempt from reporting.
124
  The abundance of CTRs filed pertains to regular day-to- 
day business transactions, yielding little information with respect to terrorist financing 
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and or informal money remitters.
125
  The cost does not appear to effectively address the 
problems surrounding informal terrorist financial networks.  An intelligence leak in 
approximately 2010 revealed these exact frustrations; that despite U.S. efforts, a budding 
terrorist financing apparatus still remains.  The document cited fundraising measures 
through kidnapping for ransom, bank robbery, the drug trade, and donations received 
during yearly pilgrimages to Mecca.
126
 
As previously discussed, money laundering associated with hawala networks were 
the primary focus of regulators prior to 9/11, and justifiably so as FATF estimates link 
hawala networks closely to a money laundering network that the International Monetary 
Fund estimates peg at over 3 trillion a year.
127
  When compared to hawala networks, and 
the money tied to attacks, which could cost as little as $10,000, and in the case of the 
9/11 attacks approximately $500,000, the difference between estimated flow of money 
and the money to finance an attack is dramatic; a proverbial needle in a haystack.
 128
    
The main terrorist financing language in the Patriot Act in substance has remained 
consistent since the laws passage.  By 2015, Al Qaeda’s network has been deeply 
fragmented and their leadership structure and organization has been greatly degraded.  As 
such, it would suggest that the funding mechanisms have become fragmented.  Included 
in the evolution of terrorism is the rise of ISIS.  Preliminary assessments of the group 
suggest a funding machine fueled by extortion, ransom, plundering, and illicit oil 
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smuggling.  Estimates peg ISIS income at $1 million to $5 million dollars generated a 
day.
129
   These earning tactics are all occurring through informal networks, and outside 
the United States purview, therefore, immune to the influence of any provision inherent 
in the Patriot Act.   
In addressing the ever-evolving threat posed by terrorist financing it is important 
to be able to understand the nature of the threat and adjust priorities accordingly.  From a 
regulatory standpoint there is little to take away from the added reporting requirements 
inherent in the Patriot Act in order to address informal terrorist financial networks.  
While the establishment of a public-private partnership is helpful in creating transparency 
and information sharing, new strategies need to be debated to close the gap between the 
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Key Findings 
 The objective of this thesis is a review Title III of the Patriot Act, which aims to 
uncover terrorist financing and take enforcement action accordingly.  This occurs on 
several fronts, both domestically and internationally, and through formal and informal 
networks.  In addressing this threat, Title III enhanced the government’s capabilities to 
monitor suspicious activity through increased reporting requirements, and encouraging 
partnerships abroad to both adhere to international money laundering standards and 
punish those countries and financial institutions that do not comply. Additionally, greater 
transparency was sought to formalize the informal money transmitter by requiring and 
enforcing registration through the FinCEN. The enhanced reporting requirements are 
evidenced through the increase in SAR and CTR filling since the laws inception.  The 
enhanced international compliance requirements are evidenced through the S. 311 actions 
taken against foreign countries and institutions of particular terrorist financing concern.  
The enhanced registration of informal money transmitters is evidenced through the 
increase in registrants since the laws inception.  In creating a venue that fosters increased 
information sharing, greater compliance, and increased informal money transmitter 
registration, the central question to ask is whether these changes have met the objective 
of combating terrorist financing.  What enforcement actions have been taken as a result 
of these changes?   
 The evidence to make this conclusion is demonstrated through the actions taken 
under the law that have effectively disrupted and dismantled terrorist networks that target 
the United States.  The main intent of the Patriot Act is to “to deter and punish terrorist 
acts in the United States and around the world, to enhance law enforcement investigatory 
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tools, and for other purposes.”
130
  As articulated in this first sentence of the Patriot Act, 
the main objective of the law is two-fold: deter and punish.  From a punishment 
standpoint, The Patriot Act provisions amended the BSA statutes, both civilly and 
criminally.  As an example, a civil action can be taken when a company fails to comply 
with BSA standards and is subject to fines.  The Bank Secrecy Act involved statute’s 
where there is a criminal recourse is associated with money laundering and operating an 
unregistered MSB.  As an example, a criminal action can be taken when a terrorist tries to 
conceal their finances in furtherance of funding some sort of terrorist activity.   
 The evidence suggests that enforcement actions have remained fairly limited.  
This conclusion can be drawn through a review of actions taken, civil or criminal, as a 
result of Title III.  As discussed, the foreign component did not directly target Al Qaeda 
and its affiliates through S. 311 provision.  The Department of Justice, the prosecutorial 
arm of the United States government, touted the successful actions taken against terrorists 
under Attorney General Eric Holder from June, 2010 to March, 2015.
131
  Of this sample 
size of approximately 60 cases, 13 cases were against individuals with affiliations to Al 
Qaeda.  The charge most prevalent from case to case is providing material support to a 
terrorist organization.  Material support is defined by U.S. Code as “any property, 
tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary instruments or financial 
securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safe houses, 
false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, 
lethal substances, explosives, personnel (one or more individuals who may be or include 
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oneself), and transportation, except medicine or religious materials.”
132
  The Patriot Act 
influence within this statute is by way of Section 805 which redefined material support to 
make it explicit that monetary contributions are considered material.  Of this sample size, 
the lone case where it was explicit that an individual was being charged with providing 
financial support to Al Qaeda was the case of Wesam El-Hanafi.  El-Hanafi was 
convicted in January 2015 on several counts of providing material support to Al 
Qaeda.
133
  With respect to providing financial support, El-Hanafi was involved in 
funneling $67,000 to operatives abroad.
134
  It is not clear if the Title III provisions aided 
in flagging those proceeds or whether another mechanism was afoot.  No enforcement 
actions under Title III were taken. 
 The same trend is noticeable in the Senate Intelligence Committee’s list of arrests 
and stopped plots from 2009-2012. Of the actions taken against terrorist networks with a 
focus on attacking the United States, the material support violations have been prevalent.  
The three cases that explicitly mentioned a financial support nexus were the three 
separate cases against Khalid Ouazzani, Raja Ladrasib Khan, Mohammad Hassan 
Khalid.
135
  All three defendants had connections with Al Qaeda.  Ouazzani used the 
proceeds of an apartment sale in the United Arab Emirates to support Al Qaeda.
136
 Khan 
attempted to send funds to Al Qaeda oversees.  The trip wire that uncovered Khan’s 
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intentions was through an undercover investigation.
137
  Mohammad Hassan Khalid 
offered to facilitate the transfer of money to Al Qaeda.
138
  It is not clear through which 
means money was transferred or whether money was actually transferred.  Khalid was 
charged with providing material support to a terrorist organization. It is not clear whether 
any of the financial activity in these cases was flagged due to Title III provisions.  None 
of the defendants were charged with any Title III violations. 
 
Thesis Limitations: 
 Enforcement action is one intended objective of Title III.  However, since 9/11 
national security has taken a proactive posture; stopping an incident before it happens.  
As such, deterrence is another intended objective.  Although Title III may in fact 
achieved successes through deterrence, there is no measurement to determine the 
intelligence component and whether or not, regardless of the charges, the information 
provided through increased SAR and CTR reporting added clues to an eventual arrest or 
conviction.  The deterrent strategy cannot be measured.  If an event doesn’t occur one 
cannot assess why it did not happen.  Additionally, Title III of the Patriot Act is a small 
part to a greater whole.  The enhancements in other aspects of the Patriot Act, tracking 
travel to and from the country, increased FISA authority, among others have played a 
factor in making it more difficult to conduct an attack.  One can argue that even though 
few cases have been brought against Al Qaeda and its affiliates, Title III has been a 
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success, offering a complimentary role in the grand scheme.  These mitigating factors add 
to the difficulty in taking a stance as to whether or not Title III has been effective.  
 
Conclusion: 
 Title III of the Patriot Act is one part to the whole of the counterterrorism 
apparatus. Specifically, Title III of the Patriot Act is the national security tool to identify 
and punish terrorism financiers.  Although Al Qaeda has diminished and de-centralized, 
there is little empirical evidence to directly point to the Title III provisions having success 
in targeting Al Qaeda’s financial network.  Targeting in the sense that the Title III 
provisions have not played a large role in enforcement actions against terrorist networks 
with a focus on doing harm to the United States.   
 Similar to Al Qaeda, there has been a trend toward more informal terrorist 
networks that sympathize with a cause and take independent action as “lone wolf” actors.  
Since 9/11, the two terrorist attacks on U.S. soil, the 2013 Boston marathon bombing, and 
the Fort Hood shooting, have mirrored the lone wolf model.  Additional terrorist related 
incidents that have garnered significant attention in the media to include the rise of ISIS, 
the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris, and the attack on Canadian Parliament have created a 
dialogue with respect to addressing the contemporary threat posed by lone actors inspired 
by extremist rhetoric.  Based on these incidents, the blurred lines between the lone wolf 
and a sophisticated terrorist network have become muddled. This decentralization of 
terrorist activity makes it even more difficult to uncover terrorist related activities.  The 
recent attacks were not heavily leveraged financially and did not prompt any concern 
from financial institutions.  There was nothing to report.  
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 Formality, however, is relative.  Even at its most organized, there is little 
information to suggest that formal financial networks, at home or abroad, were essential 
to Al Qaeda’s operational efforts.  Much of the Title III provisions were focused on 
formal compliance and information sharing.  The Title III provisions increased reporting 
from legitimate financial institutions but there was little evidence linking financial 
transactions to terrorist financing.  As such, the increase in information gleaned under 
Title III did not prompt robust enforcement action.  Such is the case with informal 
financial networks.  While measures were taken to create greater transparency through 
MSB registration, little information has yielded enforcement action as a result of the Title 
III provisions.  In totality, while the increase in intelligence and information sharing as a 
result of the Title III provisions of the Patriot Act may have fostered a robust deterrent 
posture, the punishment arm manifested in the form of successful convictions, has not 
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